Introduction
Sometimes it is needed in approximate reasoning to deal simultaneously with both fuzziness of propositions and modalities, for instance one may try to assign a degree of truth to propositions like "John is possibly tall" or "John is necessarily tall", where "John is tall" is presented as a fuzzy proposition. Fuzzy logic should be a suitable tool to model not only vagueness but also other kinds of information features like certainty, belief or similarity, which have a natural interpretation in terms of modalities.
We address in this paper the case of pure modal operators for Gödel logic, one of the main systems of fuzzy logic arising from Hájek [11] classification. For this purpose we consider a many-valued version of Kripke semantics for modal logic where both, propositions at each world and the accessibility relation, are infinitely valued in the standard Gödel algebra [0, 1] .
We provide strongly complete axiomatizations for the -fragment and the 3-fragment of the resulting minimal logic. These fragments are shown to behave quite asymmetrically. Validity in the first one is univocally determined by the class of frames having a crisp (that is, two-valued) accessibility relation, while validity in the second requires truly fuzzy frames. In addition, the -fragment does not enjoy the finite model property with respect to the number of worlds or the number of truth values while the 3-fragment does.
We consider also the Gödel analogues of the classical modal systems T, S4 and S5 for each modal operator and show that the first two are characterized by the many-valued versions of the frame properties which characterize their classical counterparts.
Our approach is related to Fitting [7] who considers Kripke models taking values in a fixed finite Heyting algebra; however, his systems and completeness proofs depend essentially on finiteness of the algebra and he fact that his languages contain constants for all the truth values of the algebra. We most relay on completely different methods.
Modal logics with an intuitionistic basis and Kripke style semantics have been investigated in a number of relevant papers (see Ono [12] , Fischer Servi [5] , Boszic and Dosen [3] , Font [8] , Wolter [13] , from an extensive literature), but in all cases the models carry two (or more) crisp accessibility relations satisfying some commuting properties: a pre-order to account for the intuitionistic connectives and one or more binary relations to account for the modal operators. Our semantics has,.instead, a single arbitrary fuzzy accessibility relation and does not seem reducible to those multi-relational semantics since the latter enjoy the finite model property for (cf.Grefe [10] ).
We assume the reader is acquainted with modal and Gödel logics and the basic laws of linear Heyting algebras (cf. Chagrov [2] ).
Gödel-Kripke models
The language L 3 of propositional Gödel modal logic is built from a set V ar of propositional variables, logical connectives symbols ∧, →, ⊥, and the modal operator symbols and 3. Other connectives are defined:
L and L 3 will denote, respectively, the -fragment and the 3-fragment of the language.
As stated before, the semantics of Gödel modal logic will be based in fuzzy Kripke models where the valuations at each world and also the accessibility relation between worlds are [0, 1]-valued. The symbols · and ⇒ will denote the Gödel norm in [0, 1] and its residuum, respectively:
the derived maximum and pseudo-complement operations will be denoted and −, respectively. This yields the standard Gödel algebra; that is, the unique Heyting algebra structure in the linearly ordered interval. Definition 2.1 A Gödel-Kripke model (GK-model) will be a structure W, S, e where:
• W is a non-empty set of objects that we call worlds of M.
The evaluations e(x, −) : V ar → [0, 1] are extended simultaneously to all formula in L 3 by defining inductively at each world x:
e(x, ϕ ∧ ψ) := e(x, ϕ) · e(x, ψ) e(x, ϕ → ψ) := e(x, ϕ) ⇒ e(x, ψ) e(x, ⊥) := 0 e(x, 2ϕ) := inf y∈W {Sxy ⇒ e(y, ϕ)} e(x, 3ϕ) := sup y∈W {Sxy · e(y, ϕ)}.
It follows that e(x, ϕ ∨ ψ) = e(x, ϕ) e(x, ψ) and e(x, ¬ϕ) = −e(x, ϕ).
The notions of a formula ϕ being true at a world x, valid in a model M = W, S, e , or universally valid, are the usual ones:
ϕ is GK-valid, written |= GK ϕ, if it is valid in all the GK-models.
Clearly, all valid schemes of Gödel logic are GK-valid. In addition, Proposition 2.1 . The following modal schemes are GK-valid:
Proof: Let M = W, S, e be an arbitrary Gödel-Kripke model and x ∈ W.
(K ) By definition 2.1 and properties of the residuum we have for any y ∈ W : e(x, (ϕ → ψ)) · e(x, ϕ) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ (e(y, ϕ) ⇒ e(y, ψ)) · (Sxy ⇒ e(y, ϕ)) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ e(y, ψ)). Taking the meet over y in the last expression: e(x, (ϕ → ψ)) · e(x, ϕ) ≤ e(x, ψ), hence e(x, (ϕ → ψ)) ≤ e(x, ϕ → ψ).
(Z ) Utilizing the Heyting algebra identity: − − (x ⇒ y) = (x ⇒ − − y), we have: e(x, ¬¬2θ) = − − e(x, 2θ) ≤ − − (Sxy ⇒ e(y, θ)) = (Sxy ⇒ − − e(y, θ)) = (Sxy ⇒ e(y, ¬¬θ)). Taking meet over y in the last expression: e(x, ¬¬2θ) ≤ e(x, 2¬¬θ).
(D 3 ) By properties of suprema and distributivity of over ·, e(3(ϕ ∨ ψ)) = sup y {Sxy · (e(y, ϕ) e(y, ϕ))} = sup y {Sxy · e(y, ϕ)} sup y {Sxy · e(y, ϕ)} (Z 3 ) Sxy · e(¬¬ϕ, y) ≤ − − (Sxy · e(ϕ, y)) ≤ − − e(3ϕ, x) = e(¬¬3ϕ, x).
(F 3 ) e(x, 3⊥) = sup y {Sxy · 0} = 0.
The Modus Ponens rule preserves truth at every world of any GK-model. On the other hand, the classical introduction rules for the modal operators
do not preserve local truth. However, Proposition 2.2 RN and RN 3 preserve validity at any given model, thus they preserve GK-validity.
Proof: . (RN ) If e(x, ϕ) = 1 for all x then e(x, ϕ) = inf y {Sxy ⇒ e(y, ϕ)} = inf{1} = 1 for all x. (RN 3 ) If e(x, ϕ → ψ) = 1 for all x then Sxy · e(y, ϕ) ≤ Sxy · e(y, ψ) ≤ e(x, 3ψ). Taking join over y in the left hand side of the last inequality, e(x, 3ϕ) ≤ e(x, 3ψ).
Semantic consequence is defined for any theory T ⊆ L 3 , as follows: 
An alternative notion of logical consequence arises naturally. Set e(x, T ) = {e(x, ϕ) : ϕ ∈ T } then: Clearly, |= GK≤ implies |= GK , and it will follow from our completeness theorems that both notions are equivalent for countable theories. This fact has been already observed for pure Gödel logic by Baaz and Zach in [1] .
Note that Modus Ponens preserves consequence but this is not the case of the inference rules RN and RN 3 .
On strong completeness of Gödel logic
To prove strong completeness of the unimodal fragments L and L 3 we will reduce the problem to pure Gödel propositional logic.
In the rest of this paper L(X) will denote the Gödel language built from a set of propositional variables X and the connectives ∧, →, ⊥.
Let G be a fixed axiomatic calculus for Gödel logic, say the following one given by Hájek ([11] , Def. 4.2.3.):
From ϕ and ϕ → ψ, infer ψ ⊢ will denote deduction in this calculus.
It is well known that G is deductively equivalent to Dummett logic, the intermediate logic obtained by adding to Heyting calculus the pre-linearity schema:
according to the Gödel interpretation of the connectives. We will need the following strong form of standard completeness for Gödel logic:
Proposition 3.1 Let T be a countable theory and U a countable set of formulas of L(X) such that for every finite S ⊆ U we have T S then there is a valuation v :
Proof: Extend T to a prime theory T ′ (that is, T ′ ⊢ α ∨ β implies T ′ ⊢ α or T ′ ⊢ β ) satisfying the same hypothesis with respect to U (this is standard). The Lindenbaum algebra L(X)/ ≡T ′ of T ′ is linearly ordered since by primality and the pre-linearity schema
As T ′ is countable we may assume X is countable and thus, being also countable, L(X)/ ≡T ′ is embeddable in the Gödel algebra [0, 1], therefore, we may assume v :
From the proposition we obtain the usual formulation of completeness for countable T . We can not expect strong standard completeness of G for uncountable theories, as the following example illustrates.
On the other hand, there is no valuation v such that v(T ) = 1 and v(q) < 1, because that would imply v(p β → p α ) < 1 for all α < β < ω 1 , and thus the set {v(p α ) : α < ω 1 } would be ordered in type ω 1 , which is impossible because any well ordered subset of ([0, 1], <) is at most countable.
Completeness of the -fragment
Let G be the formal system on the language L which is obtained by adding to the system G for Gödel logic (applied to L ) the following axiom schemes and rule:
⊢ G ϕ expresses theorem-hood in this logic. Proofs with assumptions are also allowed, with the restriction that NR is to be applied to theorems only (or, what amounts to the same, to previous steps of the proof not depending on the assumptions). T ⊢ G ϕ will express that there is such a proof of ϕ with assumptions from the set T.
The deduction theorem follows readily by induction in the length of proofs:
Applying consecutively DT, NR , K , and M P, we obtain the derived rule:
We obtain also soundness of G :
Proof: By the deduction theorem, T ⊢ G ϕ implies ⊢ G (∧Σ → ϕ) for some finite Σ ⊆ T. Since the axioms of G are valid in all GK-models (Prop. 2.1) and MP, NR , K preserve validity (Prop. 2.2) then |= GK (∧Σ → ϕ). Therefore, inf e(x, T ) ≤ e(x, ∧Σ) ≤ e(x, ϕ) for any world x in any GK-model.
Since all uses of NR in a proof of T ⊢ G ϕ produce theorems of G , the proof may bee seen as one in which Modus Ponens is the only rule utilized and T G is part of the assumptions. That is,
To prove strong completeness of G we will define a canonical GK-model with the property that for any countable theory T and any formula ϕ such that T G ϕ, there is a world x in the model which assigns the value 1 to T but less than 1 to ϕ. A surprising fact will be that this may be achieved with a model where the accessibility relation is crisp.
Let L = { θ : θ ∈ L } be the set of formulas in L which start with the connective . Then any formula in L may be seen as a formula of the pure Gödel language built from X = V ar ∪ L by means of ∧, ¬, ⊥. That is, we may consider the formulas in L as additional propositional variables for Gödel logic.
Canonical model M = (W * , S * , e * ).
• The set of worlds W * will consist of those valuations v :
according to the Gödel interpretation of ∧, →, ⊥.
• The fuzzy accessibility relation between worlds in M (actually a crisp relations) will be given by
• The valuation associated to the world v will be v ↾ V ar. That is, e * (p, v) = v(p) for any p ∈ V ar.
For the sake of simplicity, we will write v(ϕ) for v(ϕ), from now on. Proof: This is proven by induction in the complexity of ϕ seen again as a formula of L . The atomic step and the inductive steps for the Gödel connectives being straightforward, it is enough to verify inductively e * (v, 2ϕ) = v(2ϕ). By induction hypothesis we may assume e * (w, ϕ) = w(ϕ) for any w,and thus we must show
Since equality above is trivial for v( ϕ) = 1, it remains only to show in case
That is, for any ǫ > 0 there is w such that S * vw = 1 and w(ϕ) < α + ǫ. To see this we prove first:
Claim. Let v be a world of M and ϕ be such that v(2ϕ) = α < 1, then there exists a world u of M such that u(ϕ) < 1 and
Proof: Assume v(2ϕ) = α < 1 and set
Notice that v(2µ) > α for any µ ∈ T ϕ,v because v(2θ) > 0 implies v(¬¬2θ) = 1, and thus v(2¬¬θ) = 1 since v satisfies axiom Z . This implies that T ϕ,v G ϕ. Otherwise, µ 1 , ..., µ k ⊢ G ϕ for some µ i ∈ T ϕ,v and thus
by Lemma 4.1. Hence, by Lemma 4.2 and the previous observations, As g is an homomorphism of Heyting algebras, the valuation w = g • u preserves the value 1 of the formulas in T G and thus it belongs to M . Moreover, v(2θ) ≤ w(θ) for all θ: (2) above, and thus w(θ) = g(u(θ)) ∈ (α, α + ǫ) ∪ {1}. This means S * vw = 1, and since u(ϕ) < 1 we have, w(ϕ) = g(u(ϕ)) < α + ǫ, which shows 1.
Call a GK-model crisp if S : W × W → {0, 1}, and write T |= Crisp ϕ if the consequence relation holds at each node of any crisp GK-model. 
T |= Crisp ϕ. The example in Section 3 shows that standard strong completeness does not hold in modal Gödel logic with respect to uncountable theories.
G does not have the finite model property
The following example shows that G does not have the finite model property with respect to GK-models. The scheme 
Now, e(v, ¬¬2θ) = 0 iff and only if e(v, 2θ) = 0, which means there is a sequence of worlds {w n } n such that {Svw n ⇒ e(w n , θ)} n converges to 0, that is,
Svw n > e(w n , θ) for all n ∈ N, and {e(w n , θ)} n converges to 0 1, otherwise (3) Assume e(v, 2¬¬θ) = 1. Then, according to (2), Svw = 0 or e(w, θ) > 0 for any w ∈ W. If we had e(v, ¬¬2θ) = 0, then the sequence {w n } n∈N given by (3) would satisfy: Svw n > e(w n , θ), and hence e(w n , θ) > 0 for all n by the previous observation. If W is finite, the set {e(w n , θ) : n ∈ N} has a minimum positive value and thus the sequence, {e(w n , θ)} n would not converge to 0, a contradiction.
The proof of the theorem shows that 2¬¬θ → ¬¬2θ would be valid in all GK models with finite Gödel algebra of values.
Completeness of the 3-fragment
The system G 3 results by adding to G the following axiom schemes and rule in the language L 3 :
As in the case of the -fragment, in proofs with assumptions the rule RN 3 is to be used in theorems only, and under this definition we have the deduction theorem DT, the derived rule:
and the soundness theorem:
Let T G 3 be the set of theorem of G 3 , then it follows, as in the case of G , that when the formulas in 3L 3 are seen as propositional variables and v is extended to L 3 = L(V ar ∪ 3L 3 ) as a Gödel valuation.
Lemma 6.3 T ⊢ G3 ϕ if and only if
• The fuzzy relation between worlds in M 3 is given by
• e * (v, p) := v(p) for any p ∈ V ar.
Lemma 6.4 For any world v in the canonical model M 3 and any ϕ ∈ L 3 we have e * (v, ϕ) = v(ϕ).
Proof:
The only non trivial step in a proof by induction on complexity of formulas of L 3 is that of 3. By induction hypothesis, e * (v, 3ϕ) = sup w {S * vw · e * (w, ϕ)} = sup w {S * vw · w(ϕ)}, then we must show sup w {S * vw · w(ϕ)} = v(3ϕ). By definition
for any ϕ ∈ L 3 and w ∈ W * , then S * vw · w(ϕ) ≤ v(3ϕ), which yields taking join over w:
The other inequality is trivial if v(3ϕ) = 0. For the case v(3ϕ) > 0, let w be given as in the following claim then v(3ϕ) = α = S * vw · w(ϕ) ≤ e * (v, 3ϕ), ending the proof of the lemma.
Claim. If v is a world of M 3 such that v(3ϕ) = α > 0, there exists a world w of M 3 such that w(ϕ) = 1 and S * vw = α.
Proof: Set
This set is not empty because v(30) = 0 by axiom F 3 . Moreover, for any finite subset of Γ ϕ,v , say {θ 1 , ..., θ n } ∪ {¬¬µ 1 , ..., ¬¬µ m }, we have
Otherwise, we would have
which would imply by Lemma 6.2
a contradiction. Therefore, we have by Lemma 6.1
By Proposition 3.1 there is a Heyting algebra valuation u : L → [0, 1] such that u(ϕ) = u(T G 3 ) = 1 and u(θ) < 1 for all θ ∈ Γ ϕ,v . Thus, u satisfies the further conditions: 
where δ is given by (4) . Clearly the valuation w = g•u inherits the properties (i), (ii) (iii) of u, with (ii) in the stronger form:
Moreover, w(θ) > 0 implies w(θ) > δ/2, by construction, and w(T G 3 ) = 1 because g is an homomorphism of Heyting algebras, hence, w belongs to
Theorem 6.1 For any countable theory T and formula
Proof: Assume that T G3 ϕ, then T ∪ T G 3 ϕ. By strong completeness of Gödel logic, there is a Heyting algebra valuation v such that v(T ∪ T G 3 ) = 1 and v(ϕ) < 1. Since v might not be a world in M 3 compose it with the Heyting algebra homomorphism: g(x) = (x + 1)/2 for x > 0, g(0) = 0. Then
By Lemma 4.2 we have again, as in the case of L , that |= GK and |= GK≤ coincide in L 3 . However, |= GK no longer coincides with |= Crisp as the following example illustrates.
Example. G 3 is not complete for crisp models. The formula ¬¬3ϕ → 3¬¬ϕ holds in all crisp models because e(x, ¬¬3ϕ) > 0 implies that there is y such that Sxy · e(y, ϕ) > 0. Thus, Sxy = 1 and − − e(y, ϕ) = 1 showing that e(y, 3¬¬ϕ) ≥ Sxy ·(−−e(y, ϕ)) = 1. But this formula is not a theorem of G 3 because it fails in the two worlds model:
where e(x, ¬¬3p) = 1, and e(y, 3¬¬ϕ) = 
G 3 has the finite model property
For any sentence ϕ such that G3 ϕ we may construct a finite counter-model inside M 3 . Proof: It follows from the Claim in Lemma 6.4 that for all θ and v ∈ M 3 there is w ∈ M 3 such that v(3θ) = S * vw·w(θ). (if v(3θ) = 0 any w works). Given θ, let f θ (v) be a function choosing one such w for each v. For any formula θ let r(θ) be the nesting degree of 3 in θ, that is, the length of a longest chain of occurrences of 3 in the tree of θ.
Given ϕ such that ⊢ G3 ϕ, let v 0 be a world (valuation) in M 3 such that v 0 (ϕ) < 1. For each j ≤ n = r(ϕ), let S j be the set of subformulas of ϕ of rank ≤ j, and define inductively the following sets of valuations:
Clearly, M n is finite. Consider the model induced in M n by restricting e * and S * of M 3 to M n × V ar and M n × M n respectively. We call this model M n for simplicity. Then for any formula 3θ ∈ S j and v ∈ M n−j there is w ∈ M n−(j−1) such that v(3θ) = S * vw · w(ϕ), and thus
This permits to show by induction in j ≤ n that for all θ ∈ S j , v ∈ M n−j we have v(θ) = e Mn (v, θ). In particular, e Mn (v 0 , ϕ) = v 0 (ϕ) < 1, which shows M n ϕ.
The proof of the previous theorem still works if we define the accessibility relation in M n using only subformulas of ϕ, 
Modal extensions
The modal systems we have considered so far correspond to minimal modal logic, the logic of Gödel-Kripke models with an arbitrary accessibility fuzzy relation. We may consider also for each modal operator the analogues of the classical modal systems T, S4 and S5, usually presented as combinations of the following axioms:
Call a GK-model M = W, S, e reflexive if Sxx = 1 for all x ∈ W , (min)transitive if Sxy·Syz ≤ Sxz for all x, y, z, and symmetric if Sxy = Syx for all x, y ∈ W. Proof: If Sxx = 1 for all x then (T ): e(x, 2ϕ) ≤ (Sxx ⇒ e(x, ϕ)) = e(x, ϕ), and (T 3 ): e(x, 3ϕ) ≥ Sxx · e(x, ϕ) = e(x, ϕ).
Assume Sxy · Syz ≤ Sxz for all x, y, z.(4 ): e(x, 2ϕ) · Sxy · Syz ≤ (Sxz ⇒ e(z, ϕ)) · Sxz ≤ e(z, ϕ). Hence, e(x, 2ϕ) · Sxy ≤ (Syz ⇒ e(z, ϕ)). Taking meet over z in the right hand side: e(x, 2ϕ) · Sxy ≤ e(y, 2ϕ); hence, e(x, 2ϕ) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ e(y, 2ϕ)) for all y and thus e(x, 2ϕ) ≤ e(x, 22ϕ). (4 3 ): For any x, y, z, Sxy · Syz · e(z, ϕ) ≤ Sxz · e(z, ϕ) ≤ e(x, 3ϕ). Hence, Syz · e(z, ϕ) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ e(x, 3ϕ)). Taking join over z in the left, e(x, 3ϕ) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ e(x, 3ϕ)), thus Sxy · e(x, 3ϕ) ≤ e(x, 3ϕ)). Taking join again in the left, e(x, 33ϕ) ≤ e(x, 3ϕ).
Assume Sxy = Syx for all x, y. (B ): We prove the stronger ¬ϕ → 2¬2ϕ. Assume e(x, ¬ϕ) > 0 then e(x, ϕ) = 0. Take any y such that Sxy > 0, then e(y, 2ϕ) ≤ (Syx ⇒ e(x, ϕ)) = (Sxy ⇒ e(x, ϕ)) = 0. Therefore, e(y, ¬2ϕ) = 1, and (Sxy ⇒ e(y, ¬2ϕ)) = 1. This shows that x(2¬2ϕ) = 1. (B 3 ): Suppose e(x, ϕ) > e(x, ¬3¬3ϕ) then e(x, ¬3¬3ϕ) = 0 and e(x, 3¬3ϕ) = 1. This means that there is y such that Sxy · e(x, ¬3ϕ) > 0 thus Sxy > 0 and e(x, ¬3ϕ) = 1, hence e(y, 3ϕ) = 0, therefore, Syx · e(x, ϕ) = 0 which is absurd because Syx = Sxy > 0 and e(x, ϕ) > 0 by construction.
Let Ref , T rans, and Symm denote the GK-classes of models satisfying, respectively,reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry, and let |= C denote semantic consequence with respect to models in the class C. Proof: Soundness follows from Proposition 8.1. Completeness follows, in each case, by asking the worlds of the canonical models introduced in the completeness proofs of G and G 3 to satisfy the corresponding schemes. The key fact is that these schemes force the accessibility relations S * vw = inf ϕ∈L {v( ϕ) ⇒ w(ϕ)} and S * 3 vw = inf ϕ∈L3 {v(ϕ) ⇒ w(3ϕ)} to satisfy the respective properties.
Taking meet over ϕ in the last formula we get:
If v(4 3 ) = 1 then v(33ϕ) ≤ v(3ϕ) and thus
Minimizing over ϕ in the last formula we get S * 3 vv ′ · S * 3 v ′ v ′′ ≤ S * 3 vv ′′ . One of the original motivations of the second author to study these fuzzy modal logics was to interpret the possibility operator 3 in the class of Gödel frames Ref l ∩ T rans ∩ Symm as a notion of similarity in the sense of Godo and Rodríguez [9] , and a reasonable conjecture was that GS5 3 = GS4 3 +B 3 would axiomatize validity in this frames. Unfortunately, the axioms B , B 3 do not force symmetry in the canonical models. Thus, we have not been able to show completeness of G +B or G 3 +B 3 for |= Symm , even the less completeness of GS5 3 or GS5 = GS4 +B with respect to |= Ref l∩T rans∩Symm . Perhaps stronger symmetry axioms as
would do. In any case, it is possible to show that validity in Gödel Ref l ∩ T rans ∩ Symm is decidable.
Adding truth constants
The previous results on strong completeness may be generalized to languages with a set Q ⊆ [0, 1] of truth values added as logical constants to the language, provided Q is topologically discrete and well-ordered, in particular when Q is finite.
Introduce a constant connective symbol for each r ∈ Q, denoted by r itself excepting 0 and 1 which are identified with ⊥ and ⊤. Let G (Q) be the logic obtained by adding to G the axiom schemes R1 -R4 below, and let G 3 (Q) be defined similarly by adding to G 3 the book-keeping axioms R1 and R5 -R7, for all r, s ∈ Q : Note that the double negation shift axioms Z and Z 3 become superfluous (follow from R4 and R7, respectively). Moreover, R2+R3 may be replaced by the single axiom: (r → θ) ↔ (r → θ), and R5+R6 by 3(r → ϕ) ↔ (r → 3ϕ).
The evaluation of GK-models is extended by defining: e(x, r) = r for each r ∈ Q. It may be shown then that G (Q) and G 3 (Q) are strongly complete for countable theories in their respective languages, and the same holds for the logics mentioned in Theorem 8.1.
This extends substantially a result of Esteva, Godo and Nogera [4] on weak completeness of Gödel logic with rational truth constants. If one is interested in weak completeness only, no condition is needed on Q since it is enough to consider the finitely many truth constants appearing in the sentence to be proved. On the other hand, discreteness of Q is necessary for strong completeness: if r is a limit points in Q then there is a strictly increasing or decreasing sequence converging to r, say {r n } increases to sup r n = r, then {r 1 → θ, r 2 → θ, r 3 → θ....} |= GK r → θ but no finite subset of premises can grants this, thus by soundness {r 1 → θ, r 2 → θ, r 3 → θ....} G (Q) r → θ, Discreteness is not enough, however: Q = {r 1 < r 2 < .... .... < q 2 < q 1 } with sup r i = inf q i is discrete, and r 1 → θ, r 2 → θ, .... , ψ → q 1 , ψ → q 2 , .... |= GK ψ → θ but no finite subset of the premises yields the same consequence.
Comment
It rests to axiomatize validity and consequence of the full logic with both modal operators combined. It may be seen that he union of the systems G and G 3 is not enough for that purpose. However, G ∪ G 3 together with Fischer Servi [5] "connecting axioms":
may be proved to be a strongly complete axiomatization. This will be shown in a sequel of this paper.
